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Introduction and summary 
 
 
Nicaragua is a small, open economy with a population of 5.5 million in 2004, low levels of 
income (GDP per capita of US$850 in 2005), and high levels of poverty (48 percent of the 
population in 2003).
1 Since 1990 the country has undergone dramatic changes, including the 
end of a decade-long civil conflict, and the implementation of a series of economic reforms 
that liberalized prices and privatized most state-owned production. 
Almost half of all Nicaraguans live in rural areas and work in agriculture activities for 
their livelihood. The rural sector has an especially high incidence of poverty: 2 of every 3 
rural Nicaraguans are poor (World Bank 2003a). Thus, the agricultural sector plays a key role 
in the country’s poverty reduction efforts.  
Within Nicaragua’s broader policies of structural reform and liberalization, policy 
makers have sought to liberalize trade by reducing tariffs and non-tariff barriers and by 
promoting exports through fiscal incentives within a strategy based on regional integration 
agreements. Since agriculture plays a key role in the country’s economy and exports, an 
understanding of the degree of distortions to agricultural incentives is an important input to 
current and future policy decisions. 
There are at least two previous studies that analyze distortions to agricultural 
incentives for Nicaragua. MAGFOR (2000) generated nominal and effective rates of 
protection (NRPs and ERPs) for five exportable products (coffee, sugar, meat, peanuts, and 
sesame seed) and six import-competing products (maize, rice, beans, sorghum, soy and milk) 
for the years 1996, 1997 and 1998. PROVIA-USAID (2002) generated NRPs and ERPs for 
four importable agricultural goods (maize, rice, sorghum and soy), five exportable 
                                                 
1 Central Bank of Nicaragua (BCN) 2005 and World Bank (2003a).   2
agricultural goods (coffee, sugar cane, peanuts, beans, and sesame seed), and one good from 
the livestock sector (meat), for the period 1996 to 2000. The PROVIA (2002) study finds that 
importable products have high, positive nominal and effective rates of protection in 
Nicaragua while exports have negative rates of protection. This constitutes an anti-trade bias: 
the distortion to price signals encourages producing importable goods at the expense of 
exportable products.  
This study generates measures of Nominal Rates of Assistance (NRAs), and 
Consumer Tax Equivalent rates (CTEs) for twelve agricultural products in Nicaragua, for the 
period 1991–2004, using the methodology laid out in Anderson et al. (2008) and summarized 
in the general results below. We analyze five import-competing goods (maize, rice, sorghum, 
soybeans and chicken meat) and six exportable goods (coffee, sugar, peanuts, beans, beef, 
and sesame seed) plus milk that together represent more than 80 percent of agricultural GDP 
and 20 percent of total GDP in 2001 (BCN 2005). From the results, average CTEs and NRAs 
are estimated for import-competing and exportable goods, and for the agricultural sector as a 
whole, and these are compared to protection rates in the non-agricultural sector during the 
same period. 
Among the exportable crops, coffee, beans, and sugar are the main products. In the 
period 1991-2004 about 85 percent coffee production, 13 percent of bean production, and 39 
percent of sugar production was exported. Rice and maize are the main products in the 
importables category. Rice imports account for around one-quarter of domestic consumption 
while maize imports add barely one percent. Table 1 shows the shares of key products in the 
value of agricultural production. 
This study extends the time series of previous estimates of rates of protection in 
Nicaraguan agriculture, but unfortunately it is not possible to go back further than 1991 
because of an absence of meaningful data: the decade of the 1980s was one of hyperinflation 
and a high degree of government intervention in most markets such that published prices are 
not representative. 
The present study also differs from previous analyses in that it calculates NRAs using 
observed domestic prices for exportable products, rather than constructed prices. And it is the 
first study that estimates CTEs for Nicaraguan agricultural products. 
We find that agriculture exhibited a negative NRA during the 1991-2004 period. The 
NRA was –7 percent in 1991-94, -16 percent in 1995-99 and –10 percent in 2000-04. At the 
same time non-agricultural products enjoyed a positive NRA of 13 percent on average for 
that 14-year period, revealing an anti-agricultural policy bias in Nicaragua. Furthermore, 
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during that period import-competing products enjoyed a positive average NRA of 19 percent, 
while exportable primary products faced a negative average NRA of –21 percent. Thus an 
anti-trade bias also prevails. However, there are some important differences between products 
within the two categories. The importables maize and rice had positive average rates of 
protection while sorghum and soybean had negative rates. And among exportables, one 
(sugar cane) had a positive NRA.  
This chapter is organized as follows. The next section summarizes the evolution of the 
Nicaraguan economy since 1990 — a period in which the economy underwent a transition 
from high government intervention to one of market forces — and it summarizes the 
evolution of policies in the Nicaraguan agricultural sector. The following section describes 
the methodology used to estimate NRAs and CTEs. The estimates of the degrees of distortion 
in Nicaraguan agriculture are then discussed. The penultimate section summarizes the 
political economy of agricultural policies that have been implemented since 1991 that relate 
to these products, and the final section concludes with a discussion about prospects for future 
reform. 
 
Nicaragua’s economy: 1990 to 2005 
 
 
After almost two decades of rapid, sustained growth between 1960 and 1977, Nicaragua 
experienced an economic collapse characterized by a fall in output in 1978 and 1979 as a 
result of a revolutionary war (Table 2). This was followed by negative growth rates during 
the 1980s, which resulted from inadequate economic policies, adverse external shocks, and a 
prolonged civil conflict.  
By 1990, GDP per capita in Nicaragua had fallen to 43 percent of the level that it had 
been in 1977. In 1992, the worst year for Nicaragua’s foreign trade, exports were just above 
the levels reached in 1971 and were 37 percent of average exports during the 1976-79 period. 
At the same time foreign debt had grown ten-fold, reaching US$2,660 per capita. This was 
more than six times average income per capita at the time, and to service it required 4.7 times 
annual exports (IMF 1999).  
By 1990, the economy was experiencing serious macroeconomic imbalances: the 
fiscal deficit was equal to almost 18 percent of GDP, the trade and balance of payments 
deficits were 32 and 42 percent of GDP respectively, and inflation was almost 7,500 percent 
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during that year. Production by state-owned enterprises accounted for almost 30 percent of 
GDP, and almost 20 percent of the labor force was employed by the public sector (IMF 
1999). 
In the political arena, Nicaragua returned to democracy in 1990, resolving the civil 
conflicts of the previous decade and re-establishing peace. Simultaneously, the new 
government began to implement economic policies that sought to stabilize prices, return 
macroeconomic stability, and move from a state-directed to a market economy. 
Fiscal and monetary policies were strengthened, although the public sector deficit 
remained high. Most price controls were eliminated, and the foreign exchange and trade 
systems were liberalized. A structural reform program was initiated by the new government, 
which included privatization of state-owned firms and a reform of the banking system 
involving interest rate liberalization and the creation of an independent supervisor of banks. 
One of the main features of the structural reform program was to downsize the role of 
the public sector. This included privatization of state-owned firms and a reduction in the size 
of the army, from 83,000 members in 1990 to just over 15,000 members by 1993 (IMF 1999). 
As a result of these policies, the rate of unemployment increased from 7.6 percent in 1990 to 
17.8 percent in 1993; since then, it has gradually and continually decreased and was just 6.5 
percent in 2004 (BCN 2006a). 
To achieve the goal of macroeconomic stability and economic growth, one of the 
most important elements of economic policy was to maintain price stability. This was 
achieved through an expansion of foreign grants, aid and loans that have financed the 
country’s fiscal and current account deficits. An important downside of this international 
financial cooperation, however, is that it contributed to significantly large trade and current 
account deficits, which averaged 24 and 21 percent of total GDP during the 1994-2005 
period.  
In March 1991, the government set in place a fixed exchange rate system at an 
exchange rate of 5 Córdobas per US dollar, which was maintained through 1991. In 1992 a 
crawling-peg system was introduced where the exchange rate was devalued daily at a pre-
announced rate. Between 1992 and 1998, the official annual devaluation rate was 12 percent; 
it was reduced to 10 percent in 1999, to 6 percent between 2000 and 2003, and 5 percent 
during 2004-06.  
As a result of these reforms, Nicaragua has been able to achieve positive growth rates 
as of the early 1990s, with an annual average growth rate of 3.5 percent during the 2000-04 
period (BCN 2006a). Inflation has been dramatically reduced to single digits since 1999, 
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while unemployment declined from 14.9 percent in 1991 to 6.5 percent in 2004 (BCN 
2006a).  
The economy has also benefited from increasing workers’ remittances and growing 
foreign direct investment flows, although a notable weakness in the external sector is the 
country’s dependence on foreign aid, which contributes to large fiscal and current account 
deficits (IMF 2006).  
In early 2002, the new government implemented tax reforms, strengthened bank 
regulations, and attempted to reduce corruption. The program had positive results, as GDP 
growth recovered in 2003 (after a decline in 2002), inflation remained subdued, and the level 
of international reserves increased, which all facilitated a stable macroeconomic framework 
(IMF 2006). The country’s remaining economic challenges are the reduction of poverty 
(almost half of all Nicaraguans are poor), the reduction of fiscal deficit, the elimination of 
corruption, and the strengthening of exports. 
Recent economic developments have been positive, as the fiscal deficit declined, GDP 
growth rates increased to 5.1 percent in 2004 due to an increase in exports, higher commodity 
prices, growing family remittances, and expanding credit by the financial sector. 
Furthermore, Nicaragua reached HIPC completion point in early 2004, which will provide 
external debt relief and release resources for human capital investments (IMF 2006). 
 
Agriculture in Nicaragua 
 
Between 1960 and 2000, Nicaragua’s production composition remained virtually unchanged, 
and agriculture (including livestock) represented, on average, 16 percent of GDP. The share 
of other primary sectors averaged 9 percent of GDP during the same period. Agriculture’s 
role in the economy is greater of course when one considers that a large share of secondary 
and service sectors include agriculture-related activities, such as agro-industrial production, 
food processing and distribution activities of agricultural products.  
About 50 percent of Nicaraguans live in rural areas and depend on agricultural 
activities for their livelihood. Although the incidence of rural poverty has declined since 1993 
(due greatly to agricultural sector growth), 2 of every 3 rural Nicaraguans continue to live in 
poverty (World Bank 2003a). The evolution of the agricultural sector is a key determinant to 
poverty reduction in Nicaragua: the majority of agricultural producers are small (usually 
poor) farmers, and the sector employs 40 percent of all workers in the country. The coffee 
sector alone employs 32 percent of all rural workers (World Bank 2003b). 
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Nicaragua is characterized by high inequality in the distribution of land: 72 percent of 
rural households are landless or own small plots (of 1.5 hectares), and they account for only 
16 percent of land ownership. Medium and large farmers (owning farms that are 3.5 or more 
hectares) represent 28 percent of households, yet they own 84 percent of total land (Davis and 
Murgai 2000). 
Nicaraguan agriculture is extensive rather than intensive. About 80 percent of 
agricultural land is devoted to the production of staple grains (corn, beans, rice, and 
sorghum), which contributes about 30 percent of agricultural GDP. Twenty percent of land is 
devoted to export crops (coffee, sesame, sugar, tobacco and peanuts), which contribute at 
least 50 percent of agricultural GDP (World Bank 2003a). 
Agricultural products account for an important share of total exports in Nicaragua. 
During the 1994-2005 period, exports of Nicaragua’s main agricultural products represented 
50 percent of total goods exports (BCN 2006a). A main factor behind GDP growth in 
Nicaragua since 1991 was growth in exports, driven largely by growth of non-agricultural 
exports. Total exports (including exports produced in tax-free zones and purchases at ports) 
grew at an average annual rate of 14 percent between 1994 and 2005, when agricultural 
exports grew at an annual rate of 7.7 percent (BCN 2006a). 
While the agricultural sector has displayed rapid growth rates in Nicaragua during the 
past 16 years, this is deemed to be temporary. The main reasons behind the growth are high 
export commodity prices, the takeup of unoccupied land, and the stability experienced after a 
decade of civil conflict which cannot be expected to foster indefinite growth in the sector 
(World Bank 2003a). 
 
Agricultural trade policies 
 
The prices of imported white and yellow corn, sorghum and rice were regulated through a 
price-band mechanism between 1992 and 1997. The band determined the level of tariffs that 
these products would receive, which ranged between 5 and 45 percent (OMC 1999). A 
committee was formed by representatives from different government agencies, including the 
Ministries of Economy, Agriculture, and Finance; the Central Bank; the National Basic Grain 
Commission; and the Nicaraguan Grains Buying Agency (ENABAS). With this mechanism, 
import tariffs were applied to international prices when they were below the lower-bound of 
the band to ensure that the domestic price was always above the minimum threshold.  
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The price band mechanism was abandoned in 1997, and replaced by an import quota-
contingent tariff system. Imports of several agricultural products were subject to the scheme 
whereby imports within the quota pay reduced tariffs (often they are tariff-exempt), and 
imports that exceed the quota pay higher tariffs. The import quota is negotiated and defined 
for each agricultural cycle, and it is a function of the producers’ capacity to supply the 
consuming industry’s demand. Table 3 includes the list of agricultural products that are 
subject to the quota-contingent tariff structure, as well as information on the quota and tariffs 
that were negotiated between Nicaragua and the World Trade Organization in 2005 (MIFIC 
2005).  
In the case of grains, the import contingent tariff structure provides the consuming 
industry with partial or total tariff reductions during months of the year when domestic 
production is not harvested, and with a purchase price that is negotiated by the system’s 
administrative commission during the harvest months. The members of the administrative 
commission include producers, industrial consumers, and representatives of the government.  
Export promotion has been an objective sought by all governments since 1990. The 
policies to achieve this goal include a series of tax benefits and the signing of regional 
integration and trade agreements with several countries: the most important (in terms of 
market potential) is the recent CAFTA-DR with the United States.  
Intermediate and capital goods used in agricultural production have been exempt from 
import tariffs since 1991. The products that enjoy these benefits are approved by the National 
Assembly based on a list proposed by the Ministry of Economy and the Ministry of 
Agriculture. The current list has not been updated since 1998 and it is considered to be 
incomplete as it excludes many agricultural inputs that are commonly used by agricultural 
producers. 
In an effort to promote non-traditional exports, between 1992 and 1997 the 
Nicaraguan government issued tax credit certificates to exports of non-traditional goods 
(Certificados de Beneficio Tribuario or CBTs). Between 1992 and 1994 the certificate value 
was equivalent to 15 percent of the value of exports. The rate was reduced to 10 percent in 
the 1995-96 period and to 5 percent in 1997. Since the CBTs were completely transferable to 
third parties, a secondary market rapidly developed where exporters sold their excess CBTs at 
a discounted value. The CBT program also exempted non-traditional exporters from part of 
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their corporate tax obligations.
2 The program was phased out in 1997 and was substituted in 
1998 by a tax incentive scheme where all exports receive a drawback equivalent to 1.5 
percent of the value of their exports. Nonetheless, it is yet to be determined whether this 
benefit is (at least partially) passed on to export-good producers. 
 
Estimating NRAs and CTEs 
 
The present study generates measures of Nominal Rates of Assistance and Consumer Tax 
Equivalent rates at the farm and wholesale level for key agricultural products. The 
construction of these measures follows the methodology developed in Anderson et al. (2008). 
To obtain NRAs on output we compare the wholesale domestic price in Managua with the 
border price or international reference price converted at the appropriate exchange rate and 
adjusted to include costs to get it to the wholesale market. 
For importable goods, the international price we use to generate these measures is the 
reference price provided by World Bank Development Prospects Group, except in the case of 
rice where we use the CIF price.
3 For exportable products, we use FOB prices for coffee, 
sugar, meat and peanuts (processed and unprocessed), and international reference prices 
provided by FAOSTAT for sugar cane, sesame seed, livestock, and by CORECA
4 for red 
bean. To calculate the equivalent border price of the product in Managua, we add 
international transport costs, tariffs, port charges, and domestic transportation costs from port 
to Managua to the international reference price in the case of importables; and we subtract 
these costs in the case of exportables. This study also measures distortions to consumers’ 
incentives, by estimating a consumer tax equivalent (CTE) of such things as import tariffs 
and consumption taxes or subsidies on final consumer prices.  
Where there are distortions in the markets for farm inputs to a particular product, the 
NRA is adjusted to include the output price equivalent of the input subsidies (or taxes). This 
is done by subtracting the input’s CTE times its input-output coefficient from the farm 
industry’s output NRA, to get the total nominal rate of assistance to production of that good. 
                                                 
2 The corporate tax exemption rates were gradually reduced from 80 percent in 1992 to 60 percent in 1997, the 
last year of the program (BCN 2004). 
3 We used the international reference price when the ratio of imports to total domestic production was on 
average small (between 1-2 percent) or nonexistent, rendering the implicit paid price (total value of import / 
total volume of imports) unreliable to generate a series of relevant international prices. 
4 Consejo Regional de Cooperacion Agricola (Centroamerica).  
   9
This was done for each product, but since it altered the NRA by less than 2 percentage points 
we report below only the total NRA. 
Given the lack of data on margin structures for the period we are analyzing, we 
assume an equi-proportionate pass-through of distortions along the value chain for each 
product. This means that the NRAs on output at the farm-gate level are the same as estimated 
at the wholesale level. 
The estimated NRAs for the 13 covered products are summarized in Table 4. Those 
covered products account for all but one-sixth of the country’s gross value of production at 
undistorted prices (see final row of Table 4). For most products during most years producers 
faced negatives rates of protection. The three major exceptions are sugar, white maize, and 
rice. For these three products, producers had positive rates of protection. In the case of sugar 
these rates can be explained by the concentrated market structure which gives producers a 
strong capacity to influence policies. For white maize and rice, protection is largely provided 
by import tariffs. The results show that import-competing agriculture experienced positive 
rates of protection, particularly during the second half of the period (1998-2004), while 
exportable agriculture experienced negative rates of protection. Overall Figure 3 shows 
Nicaragua experienced negative NRAs, since those for exportables more than outweighed the 
positive NRAs for the import-competing sub-sector. Over the whole period, the NRA 
averaged -11 percent for the 13 products in Table 4.  
Non-covered farm products also have been affected by government policies. 
Quantifying that via price comparisons has not been possible. However, we divided that 
residual group into exportables, import-competing products and nontradables and assumed 
the NRAs for the first two of those components of non-covered products are the same as for 
covered products, and the NRA for nontradables was zero. A weighted average guesstimate 
was then generated for each year and is summarized on row 2 of Table 5. Non-product-
specific assistance to the industry – amounting to 4 or 5 percent NRA equivalent, is then 
added in to obtain NRA estimates for all agriculture and for the tradables part of the farm 
sector, shown on rows 5 and 7 of Table 5, respectively. Throughout the period the NRA for 
import-competing farm products remained above that for exportables, but that anti-trade bias 
reduced somewhat in recent years (row 6 of Table 5). 
The NRA for agriculture contrasts with the NRA for non-agricultural tradables. The 
latter has been estimated by again dividing up each of the non-farm sectors into exportable, 
nontradable and import-competing sub-sectors. Those sectors include non-agricultural 
primary products, highly processed food, non-food manufactures, and the service sector. 
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Their NRA is estimated directly from the information on import tariffs (including import 
surcharges) and export subsidies. Prices of nontradables are assumed to be undistorted, 
including for the whole of the service sector. Those NRAs are shown in detail in the 
Appendix, and are summarized in row 8 of Table 5. The rate of protection to non-agricultural 
tradables averaged around 12 percent in the 1990s and in the present decade to date. This is 
illustrated in Figure 3, together with the trend in the average NRA for agricultural tradables 
and the relative rate of assistance (RRA, derived from those two NRAs, as described in 
footnote d of Table 5). It shows that, relative to other sectors, the taxing of agriculture peaked 
at around 25 percent in the mid-1990s when international prices were high, but by 2004 the 
RRA somewhat less negative at just under -15 percent. 
Estimates of CTEs are reported in Table 6. They show a somewhat similar pattern to 
NRAs on output. Sugar, white maize and rice had large and positive tax rates over the period. 
The same factors that explain NRAs on output explain the high CTEs. Meat also has had a 
positive CTE. For most years, the weighted average CTEs on both importables and 
exportables were positive, with the average CTE for importables five points above that for 
exportables (21 percent as compared with 26 percent). These large rates of taxation affect 
mainly low-income and poor families, as white maize, rice, and sugar constitute an important 
share of the basic consumption basket of these households.  
 
 
Results by products 
 
Before turning to the political economy behind these trends, it is helpful to review the 
distortions of the main covered products one by one. 
 
White maize 
White maize is an important agricultural product (8 percent of total agricultural GDP), with 
imports accounting for an average of 13 percent of total final domestic consumption. It 
represents around 10 percent of food expenditures by extremely poor households (World 
Bank 2003a, Table 1.3). Given that white maize is exempt from value added taxes, NRAs on 
output are equal to CTEs. In addition, because we are assuming an equi-proportionate pass-
through of distortions along the value chain, the NRAs on output at the farm-gate level are 
equal to the NRAs on output at the wholesale level.  
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Producers of white maize enjoyed positive NRAs on output during all but one year in 
the 1991-2004 period (2003 was the exception with an NRA on output of –12 percent). This 
product is characterized by high and volatile NRAs and CTEs, which can be explained in part 
by the high volatility of the domestic price.  
Kruger (2000) reveals that households are net consumers of this product, including 
poor and extremely poor households who purchase 62 and 66 percent of the white maize they 
consume, respectively. The high CTEs of white maize, therefore, imply high welfare costs to 
Nicaraguan households, especially those that are poor.  
 
Rice 
Imports of rice account for an average of 31 percent of total final domestic consumption. In 
the 1991-2004 period, rice represented an average of 7.2 percent of total agricultural GDP 
(Table 1), making it the second most important importable product in Nicaragua’s 
agricultural sector after white maize. 
As in the case of white maize, rice is exempt from value added taxes so that its NRAs 
on output are equal to CTEs, and the NRA on output at the farm-gate level is equal to the 
NRA on output at the wholesale level due to the equi-proportionate pass-through assumption 
discussed above.  
Rice producers enjoyed positive and high NRAs on output, with an average NRA on 
output (and CTE) of 23 percent during the 1991-2004 period,
5 and a peak level of protection 
in the year 2000 with an estimate equal to 71 percent. The high NRAs on output can be 
mostly explained by policy interventions. For most of the period, the NRA on output was 
correlated with the levels of tariff protection in place.  
The rice industry is oligopsonic. It is controlled by a few large processors who 
purchase small farmers’ production, and a handful of importers who have the ability to lobby 
government to implement policies that protect the sector. In addition to high import tariffs, 
rice processors and importers are able to influence the import quota quantity in the quota-
contingent tariff mechanism. Between 1991 and 1998, they were able to influence policies 
that completely prohibited rice imports from Vietnam, claiming that it was necessary for 
sanitary reasons. As the international price began to decrease in 1996, domestic rice 
producers pressured government authorities, who responded by increasing the rice import 
tariff to a maximum of 90 percent in 2003. As the tariff increased, so did the NRA. 
                                                 
5 Simple average estimated from Table 6. 
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Towards the latter part of the year 2000, Nicaragua applied safeguard measures to 
protect domestic producers from sudden reductions in the international price of rice. The 
safeguard raised the applied tariff from 30 percent to 65 percent.
6 In 2001, rice processors 
and importers negotiated an import quota with the government on the condition that they 
would pass part of the quota rent to higher domestic producer prices.  
The negative welfare effects of the high level of CTEs on consumers is even stronger 
in the case of rice than white maize, because more than 90 percent of rice consumed by 




Sorghum is the third most important importable product in Nicaragua’s agricultural GDP. Its 
economic importance stems from the role that it plays in two important industrial sectors: the 
poultry and food processing sectors.  
We have information on prices paid to sorghum producers at the processing plant. We 
add storage costs to construct the wholesale price, and subtract domestic transportation costs 
to obtain a farm-gate equivalent price.  
The sorghum industry is highly concentrated on the demand side. There are only 
seven firms—four industrial poultry and three food processing plants—that purchase the 
entire production, compared with the almost 200,000 sorghum producers (IICA 2002a).  
During the period that the price band was in place (1992 to 1997), the domestic price 
of sorghum was equal to the international price plus the necessary import tariff to ensure that 
the domestic price was at least equal to the price minimum. After the price band was 
abandoned in 1997, the associations of sorghum and poultry producers negotiated with the 
Ministry of Industry and Trade to design of a new trade policy for sorghum whereby: (i) 
producers first purchase all domestic production, using high tariffs if necessary; (ii) once 
domestic production is purchased, imports beyond that production level pay zero tariffs, (iii) 
part of the benefit of the reduced tariff is transferred to producers in a higher producer price, 
and (iv) producers and industrial consumers negotiate price, volume, and quality in their trade 
                                                 
6 Here it is important to comment on the great difficulty of obtaining consistent tariff rates in Nicaragua. In 
general there are several different sources for import tariffs such as the Central Bank, the Ministry of 
Agriculture, the Customs Service, and the Ministry of Economy among others; in all products, the tariffs 
reported by each source are different. In many cases the differences are extremely large, making the series 
completely incomparable. When in doubt we used measures reported by the Customs Service.  
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contracts. The Ministry of Industry and Trade acts as a mediator in their negotiations and 
enforces any agreement (IICA 2002a).  
Although in principle domestic prices are not shielded from evolutions in 
international markets of sorghum and yellow corn, they are mostly a reflection of the 
bargaining process described above. In 1996, due to pressure from interest groups, the 
government increased the tariff on sorghum imports to a maximum of 30 percent in 2000–01. 
In 2000, safeguard measures were implemented to protect domestic sorghum producers from 
reductions in the international price of sorghum and yellow corn.
7 The safeguard increased 
the tariff applied to sorghum from 15 percent to 30 percent. In spite of these policies, the 
NRAs for sorghum were negative during most of the 1991-2004 period. 
From these largely negative rates of assistance a natural question arises: why don’t 
sorghum producers export their product instead of negotiating with large industrial buyers, 
often under unfavorable negotiating conditions? Part of the answer lies in the fact that most 
sorghum producers are small (80 percent or sorghum farms are 35 hectares or less in size) 
and they have little knowledge on how to export. Indeed, three characteristics of sorghum 
producers were identified by a World Bank (2003b) study as key constraints to the export 
competitiveness of Nicaragua: low levels of organization, inadequate access to marketing 
resources, and (possibly) limited implementation of quality/sanitary management systems. 
 
Soybean 
Imports of soybean represent almost 13 times the level of domestic production and over 2 
times the level of domestic use in the oil processing industry. The NRA of soybean shows a 
general declining trend. Overall, it decreased between 1991 and 1996, a period of rising 
international prices, and also a period when the price-band mechanism was in place. Between 
1997 and 1999, the NRA increased to 0 percent in 1999, only to decline again to a minimum 
of -53 percent in 2004. 
The soybean industry at the wholesale level (plant) is duopsonistic: producers sell 
their output to the oil-producing industry which is comprised of two plants in the whole 
country. Soybean producers are small, unorganized, and thus have limited capacity to export 
their product (see World Bank 2003b). If soybean prices are higher than that which oil 
producers are willing to pay, the substitute product is imported unprocessed oil (from 
soybean and other types of oilseeds). Indeed, in the most recent period (2000-05) the 
                                                 
7 Sorghum and yellow corn are treated as perfect substitutes as inputs (feed) in the poultry industry. 
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government has reduced tariffs on imports of unprocessed cooking oils (MIFIC 2005), and 




Coffee is the main agricultural product in Nicaragua. In 2004 it accounted for 15 percent of 
the country’s agricultural production and 17 percent of total exports. As much as 85 percent 
of production was exported in the 1991-2004 period. However, the importance of coffee has 
declined in recent years: the share of coffee in merchandise exports peaked in 1998 at 31 
percent, but has since declined to the present level of around 15 percent.  
In the construction of NRAs on output we use fob prices, while the wholesale 
domestic price comes from the price that coffee producers receive at the coffee processing 
plant. The NRA on output of coffee exhibits large swings, with periods of positive and 
negative values, particularly in the 1990s. During the whole period the (unweighted) average 
NRA on output was –13 percent.  
There are thousands of small coffee growers in Nicaragua, and a relatively small 
number of processing and exporting firms that (often) provide financing to growers, purchase 
the coffee, process and package it, and then finally export it. Thus, the large differences 
between the export price and the domestic price received by producers are due to the 
industry’s structure, where processors and exporters are able to charge a high profit margin 
for the services they offer. The negative protection rates are not influenced by government 
interventions, as this industry has almost no government regulation or export taxes, so that 
the evolution of the NRA on output is due mainly to movements in the border price. 
 
Sugar cane and processed sugar 
We estimate NRAs and CTEs for both sugar cane (primary good) and sugar (processed 
good). As in the case of coffee, the international price used in our estimates is the fob price.  
During the 1991-2004 period the importance of sugar to agricultural production 
remained relatively stable with a share of 8 percent of agricultural GDP (Table 1). At the 
same time the share of sugar in merchandise exports fluctuated between 4 and 9 percent with 
an average of 6 percent of total exports. Between 30 and 50 percent of all sugar production 
was exported, and a small share of production was imported (about 2 percent). All sugar cane 
production is used in the sugar production process. 
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As in many other countries, sugar is one of the most heavily regulated and protected 
products in Nicaragua, exhibiting extremely high, positive and increasing rates of protection 
during the period analyzed. The sugar industry is an oligopoly made up of four sugar mills 
that have the ability to lobby for protectionist policies. 
We find that protection is more than twice as high for the processed good (sugar) than 
the primary good (sugar cane), which reflects the political economy of the sector. This 
implies that Nicaraguan consumers pay a consumer equivalent tax rate of more than 100 
percent for the sugar they purchase. 
During the early 1990s, the domestic price of sugar was regulated in Nicaragua 
through a price floor to benefit producers. In addition, between 1991 and 1996 sugar imports 
were effectively prohibited by administrative decisions, as sugar importers were required to 
obtain a direct import license from the Ministry of Economy (and only a handful were 
granted). As of 1997 the import license requirement was eliminated, and the tariff on sugar 
imports between 1997 and 2004 was set at 55 percent. Sugar producers sell part of their 
production to the United States under an accorded quota price, and to the international 
market. The remaining production is sold domestically. Typically prices under the quota in 
the U.S. market are much higher than prices in the international market.  
Two non-tariff barriers remained in place after 1997: (i) between 1997 and 1999, 
sugar imports were prohibited under reciprocity rules, and they were applied to countries 
where the imports originated, and (ii) in 1999 it was determined that the price to which the 
sugar tariff would be applied would be the quota price paid by the US, not the competitive 
market price, thus prohibiting sugar imports in practice as the base to apply the tariff was 
increased (MIFIC 2005). 
 
Sesame 
Sesame is an export good: all production that meets the required quality standards by 
importing countries is sold abroad. This covers more than 90 percent of total production. The 
remaining production is consumed domestically by small and medium-sized enterprises, such 
as bakeries and small-scale candy producers. 
Sesame exhibited negative NRAs for all but two years (1993 and 19941). The average 
NRA was –30 percent during the period. The negative rates were due to large increases in the 
border price that were not reflected in the domestic price. This can be explained there are 
only five sesame processing plants and thousands of producers.  
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Groundnuts 
The peanut industry has grown rapidly during the past 15 years; its share in 
agricultural GDP increased from less than 1 percent in 1991 to 4 percent in 2004. At the same 
time the share of exports exports increased from 2.9 percent in 1991 to 5.1 percent in 2004, 
becoming one of the main agricultural exports of the country. The sector benefited between 
1992 and 1997 from a tax-incentive program—the Certificados de Beneficio Tributario, or 
CBTs—aimed at promoting non-traditional exports. The program consisted of a draw-back of 
15 percent of export value that was phased down to 1.5 percent in 1997. During the 1991-
2004 period, the peanut industry exported on average 56 percent of total production, with no 
significant imports (BCN 2006A).  
The two products we analyze in this study are unprocessed peanut (in its shell), which 
is the primary product sold to processing plants, and peanut after processing, which is the 
exported product. In our analysis of the primary good (unprocessed peanut), the domestic 
price is the wholesale price paid to producers at the plant and the international price is 
estimated based on the fob price. For the exported good, the domestic price is the producer 
price (at the processing plant) plus processing costs and the international price is the fob 
price. 
The NRA on output and CTE for peanuts differ due to the value added tax of 15 
percent that consumers pay. The farm-level NRA of unprocessed peanut production was zero 
in 1991 but rapidly declined and remained negative for the 1992–2004 period as domestic 
prices grew at lower rates than international prices obtained by Nicaraguan exports.  Since 
the tax-incentive program was phased out in 1997, the peanut sector has not experienced 
government regulations other than stable and decreasing import tariffs—from 10 percent in 
1998 to 5 percent onwards—and the tax draw-back of 1.5 percent enjoyed by all exporters 
since 1997. Thus, the declining NRAs on output were due mainly to movements in the 
international (border) price received by exporters relative to domestic prices.  
 
Red bean 
The share of beans in agricultural GDP has increased from about 5 percent at the 
beginning of the 1990s to 8.2 percent in 2004, becoming the third most important product in 
agriculture. During the 1994-2004 period, exports represented almost 15 percent of total 
production (while imports represented 3 percent of production), thereby accounting for 2.1 
percent of total exports. 
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A turning point in the sector occurred in the 1994-96 period when bean exports 
increased dramatically as the international price began a steep and sustained increase, and 
bean exports soared from 5 percent of production in 1993 to 26 percent in 1995. Official 
Central Bank data reports exports of red beans as representing 18 percent of total production 
during the 2001–2004 period; however, local authorities and producers contend that the role 
of bean exports is even greater, as a substantial amount of production is exported through the 
black market to other Central American countries. In spite of the increase in exports, the 
domestic market remains the main market for domestic producers.  
Accordingly, in the 1991 and 1993 period when there were low levels of exports 
(5 percent), the NRA was greater than zero; whereas in the post-1994 period, the NRA was 
negative (except for 1998) and averaging –14 percent (Table 1). The sustained negative rates 
of protection after 1999 and the flow of imports from neighboring countries (Costa Rica, 
Honduras, and El Salvador) motivated the government to increase import tariffs to 30 percent 
in 2003. This could explain the increase in the rates of protection during 2004, which reached 
–4 percent, as domestic prices increased more than international prices. 
 
Livestock and meat 
We analyze livestock as a primary good and bovine meat as a processed and 
exportable product. Domestic prices are from Saavedra and Vallecillo (2005), and 
international prices are based on the fob price received for exports. Nicaragua exports 47 
percent of its total meat production with virtually no imports. As Nicaragua exports different 
cuts of meat, we chose the most representative one and then selected a domestic cut of 
equivalent quality. Domestic prices (in dollar terms) of the equivalent domestic cut remained 
stable over the period of analysis, rendering the international price as the main factor in 
generating changes in the NRA. 
 
 
The political economy of agricultural-sector policies 
 
 
In seeking to understand the trend in policy interventions, it is helpful to first consider the 
Sandinista period before the reforms began in 1991. 
 
The Sandinista Regime: 1979 – 1990  
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During the decade prior to our period of analysis, the Sandinista party governed Nicaragua 
under the leadership of President Daniel Ortega. The Sandinista Revolution, which took place 
between 1978 and 1979, overthrew the Somoza dictatorship that had lasted more than 50 
years. 
The Sandinista period can be characterized as authoritarian in matters of politics and 
economics.  Among the goals of the Administration were to reduce the high poverty and 
inequalities inherited from previous governments, through direct intervention of the state in 
the economy. 
As a result, Nicaragua’s economy during the 1980s was one in which the state played 
an active role both as a regulator and through direct ownership of the means of production.  
The financial sector was nationalized, as were key industries in almost all other economic 
sectors.  
In agriculture, the government implemented an overwhelming land reform program, 
confiscating land from large land-owners (usually political adversaries or absent owners who 
had migrated out of Nicaragua).  Furthermore, the state-owned Banco de Desarrollo 
subsidized loans to small farmers and cooperatives in order to stimulate agricultural 
production. The government also participated in the distribution of agricultural goods.  The 
sale of non-traded goods was regulated through price controls, and a government agency 
(ENABAS) was created to distribute and coordinate the sale of basic staple goods.  The 
commercialization of the country’s main exportable agricultural products was centralized in 
government-owned and managed firms. 
One of the most important aspects of Nicaragua’s international commerce activities 
during the 1980s was the total trade embargo by the United States and isolation by the 
international financial community following Nicaragua’s foreign debt default.  Trade policy 
was characterized by active government controls such as the mandatory sale of foreign 
reserves to the Central Bank, multiple exchange rates, high and discretionary import tariffs, 
export taxes, and the limited issue of export licenses to firms or individuals affiliated with or 
“friendly” towards the government. 
Domestic economic policy towards the end of the 1980s resorted to inorganic 
monetary emission and large fiscal deficits (in part as a result of the U.S. trade embargo and 
isolation by the international financial community). This lead to hyperinflation and economic 
recession that lasted from the mid-1980s until 1991. 
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The reform period since 1990 
 
Nicaragua’s trade policy since 1990 focused on trade liberalization and the promotion of 
exports. The policies implemented include tariff reductions, free-trade and regional 
integration agreements, and fiscal incentives to benefit the export sector. The policies have 
been effective: the average tariff applied by Nicaragua was reduced from 43 percent in 1990 
to 5 percent in 2000 (OMC 1999). 
Nicaragua is a member of the Central American Common Market (CACM), thus, its 
present import tariff is the common external tariff of the CACM. Under its agreements with 
the WTO, the country consolidated its general trade tariffs to a maximum of 40 percent, with 
the exception of sensitive agricultural and industrial products that still have high tariff levels. 
Among these are the importable goods analyzed in this study, and two of the exportable good 
analyzed in this study: sugar and meat. Thus, whilst overall tariff reduction has been 
successful, the country’s tariff policies contain many exceptions to the general tariff rule and 
have been volatile during the last 15 years (OMC 1999).  
The broad tax reform law of 1997 was intended to eliminate biases against the 
agricultural sector by simplifying the tariff structure for agricultural goods. The number of 
tariffs was reduced by more than 50 percent and the tariff dispersion was reduced to between 
0 and 15 percent. There were fewer exceptions for sensitive goods that had high tariffs before 
the reform, including basic grains (corn, beans, rice and sorghum), milk, poultry, and sugar. 
The argument used to defend high tariffs was that they protected domestic producers from 
unfair international competition, given that international producers usually receive some kind 
of subsidy (OMC 1999).  
Nicaragua’s three government administrations since 1990 have continued to 
implement market reforms that have deepened economic liberalization. Many of these 
reforms have been the result of conditionality clauses from international financial institutions 
or from foreign governments. Examples include the privatization of the telecommunications 
and energy sectors; a major reform of the public pension system, and the privatization of 
state-owned banks.  
In the case of agricultural protection, the abandonment of the price band mechanism is 
an example of a policy brought about by foreign pressure: donations were conditioned on the 
abolition of the band and the government proceeded to eliminate it. In its place, however, 
another (more arbitrary) mechanism was set in place: the import quota-contingent tariff 
structure whereby quotas and tariffs are decided by government-producer committees.  
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Most of the policies in the agricultural sector are the result of successful lobbying by 
interest groups (producers or industrial users). As discussed above, several of the industries 
we analyzed are uncompetitive, with market power concentrated in a few key players, who 
sometimes have sufficient economic and political power to influence key policy decisions. 
The rice and sugar industries are clear examples and have been discussed above.  
When protectionist interventions are implemented, large producers, industrial 
consumers and agro-industrial food processors have been the beneficiaries of that protection. 
For instance, the government regulation that set up the price band mechanism had an explicit 
objective to ensure sufficient food for the population and to protect the interests of domestic 
basic grains producers (La Gaceta 1992). Despite the intentions to benefit consumers and 
isolate them from volatile price fluctuations, tariffs and import restrictions protect domestic 
producers and hurt consumers and small producers by raising the domestic price (Kruger 
2000).  
 
Prospects for reform 
 
 
The World Bank (2003b) summarizes the key issues, problems and bottlenecks in Nicaraguan 
agriculture, some of which are important in explaining and understanding the high rates of 
protection in the products that we analyze. That report also proposes some avenues for reform 
to increase the competitiveness of the agricultural sector. 
First and foremost, the report recommends that all discretionary policies that are 
currently in place to protect some sectors of agricultural production should be eradicated, and 
substituted by transparent and consistent rules that do not discriminate in favor of a handful 
of products. This would eliminate the possibility for interest groups to lobby officials and be 
able to influence measures that benefit their sector. A second and related recommendation is 
the elimination of all forms of price regulation through import tariffs (or any other measures), 
to allow markets to provide the signals to domestic producers and allow them to respond to 
these signals. 
Policies that promote competition, or those that improve the efficiency of marketing 
channels, would help reduce—if not eliminate—the market power that is enjoyed by many of 
the oligopsonistic firms that exist in several of the country’s key products, at the expense of 
small producers. This could include promoting public-private partnerships that reduce the 
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dependence of small producers on domestic purchasers by improving their export capacity to 
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Table 1: Product shares in the value of agricultural production, Nicaragua, 1991 to 2004 
 
(percent, at distorted prices) 
 
 
Item  1991    1992    1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999    2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
                
EXPORTABLE 
CROPS:  48.0    46.3    44.2 32.3 34.3 36.8 36.2 34.4 38.0    39.3 40.0 36.9 33.6 37.0 
Sesame (Natural)  2.1    1.5    1.2 1.2 2.0 1.5 1.9 0.7 0.5    0.5 0.5 0.1 0.4 0.6 
Coffee (Green)  19.9    17.3    21.9 11.3 11.3 12.1 12.3 15.2 15.8    18.4 18.2 14.1 12.8 14.9 
Sugar Cane  7.6    8.3    7.0 6.3 6.9 7.1 8.4 8.6 8.4    7.9 7.2 6.7 6.6 7.9 
Beans  5.3    5.3    5.1 8.8 8.2 9.7 7.0 4.3 9.0    7.4 8.4  10.4 8.2 8.2 
Groundnuts  0.6    0.6    0.5 2.1 2.7 2.3 2.6 2.8 2.7    4.0 4.1 4.0 3.9 3.8 
Others  12.4    13.4    8.5 2.7 3.3 4.0 4.0 2.7 1.7    1.2 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.7 
                
IMPORTABLE 
CROPS:  14.8    15.8    15.9 23.1 22.7 22.0 19.7 18.3 15.0    15.7 14.4 15.5 17.6 13.7 
Rice  5.3    5.7    5.6 8.6 9.6 7.8 8.1 6.7 6.9    7.2 6.8 7.7 8.2 6.9 
Maize  7.6   7.7   7.8  10.9  10.0  10.3  8.8  9.2  6.5   7.4  6.7  6.8  8.3  5.8 
Sorghum  0.0    0.4    0.3 2.7 2.3 3.1 1.8 1.4 1.0    0.8 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.8 
Soybeans  1.9    2.0    2.1 0.7 0.8 0.8 1.0 1.0 0.6    0.2 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 
Others  0.0    0.0    0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0    0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
                
LIVESTOCK  37.2    37.9    39.9 44.6 42.9 41.3 44.2 47.3 46.9    45.0 45.6 47.6 48.8 49.3 
Beef  20.0    18.2    18.5 17.6 16.8 15.9 16.4 17.4 17.4    15.8 15.8 17.0 17.6 19.0 
Milk, chicken 
      and other  17.2    19.7    21.5 27.0 26.2 25.4 27.7 29.8 29.5    29.2 29.7 30.6 31.2 30.2 
                
TOTAL  100    100    100 100 100 100 100 100 100    100 100 100 100 100 
 
Source: Central Bank of Nicaragua, BCN   24
Table 2: Growth in gross domestic product, Nicaragua, 1960 to 2004 
 
(average annual growth rate, percent) 
 
   1960-69 1970-77 1978-79 1980-89 1990-99 2000-04 
Primary Sector  7.9  4.6  -15.4  -0.8  4.7  2.4 
Crops 8.3  4.9  -13.4  0.1  5.0  n.a. 
Livestock 7.0  3.4  -16.6  -1.8  2.4  n.a. 
Fishery 23.8  9.3  -24.3  -10.3  26.2  n.a. 
Forestry -1.1  8.5  -40.1  0.7  2.2  n.a. 
        
Secondary Sector  9.7  7.0  -35.3  -2.6  4.2  4.0 
Manufacturing 11.3  6.2  -27.4  -2.9  1.8  4.7 
Construction 13.0  11.9  -74.2  -0.3  12.8  1.3 
Mining 2.8  5.7  -58.0  -1.4  16.6  3.9 
        
Tertiary Sector  6.3  5.1  -27.2  -1.2  1.7  4.5 
Commerce 7.4  5.6  -37.8  -2.6  3.5  3.2 
Central Government  4.3  6.6  -6.3  2.4  -3.7  1.6 
Communic./Transport 7.4  5.6  -21.7  -3.4  3.0  4.5 
Financial   13.1  7.3  -12.7  -1.5  2.0  8.1 
Energy and Water  13.5  4.4  -10.9  1.4  3.3  4.6 
Property 2.2  0.0  -26.6  -0.1  2.2  3.7 
Other Services  4.4  4.6  -31.9  -3.4  3.3  4.1 
        
TOTAL GDP  7.5  5.6  -26.5  -1.5  3.2  3.5 
 
Note: n.a. = not available. Growth rates = geometric average 
 

































Maize 8,742  40  60 
Bovine Meat  1,575  40  60 
Beans 2,403  40  60 
Rice 4,959  40  60 
Sorghum 6,244  40  60 
Vegetable oil 
1   2  40  60 
Sugar 
2   48  60  100 
Poultry 851  60  200 
Milk 6,068  40  75 
1 Millions of liters. 
 
2 Cubic meters 
 
Source: MIFIC (2005). 
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Table 4: Nominal rates of assistance to covered agricultural products, Nicaragua, 1991 to 2004 
(percent) 
  
1991 1992 1993 1994 1991
-94 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 1995
-99 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004  2000
-04 
         
Exportables 
a  -15 -14 -8 -24 -14.9 -29 -28 -33 -31 -24 -29.1 -19 -20 -18 -19 -14  -18.1 
Coffee  -44 -26 -20 -42 -33.1 -62 -37 -53 -59 -43 -50.5 -31 -14 -7 -44 -19  -22.8 
Sugar  2 44 43 55 36.0 50 74 62 60 60 61.2 52 35 43 35 35  40.1 
Sesame  - 3   94 21 22 - 7 -10.6 -38 -31 -15 -45 -42 -34.2 -47 -30 -39 -43 -43  -40.5 
Groundnuts  0 -1 -15 -21 -9.1 -30 -18 -35 -37 -15 -27.0 -18 -45 -30 -42 -37  -34.5 
Red beans  10 -11 86 -23 15.6 -10 -17 -12 13 -7 -6.7 -16 -31 -17 -34 -4  -20.3 
Beef  -10 -15 -19 -27 -17.6 -38 -35 -35 -26 -28 -32.4 -28 -27 -24 -17 -16  -22.4 
Milk      17 8 -15 7 n.a.  n.a. 
         
Import-competing 
a  12 13 19 6 12.5 22 4 15 30 17 17.5 52 24 31 0 16  24.9 
Maize  2 17 30 30 19.9 0 15 26 31 20 18.4 57 12 13 -12 9  15.6 
Rice  -10 -6 3 -25 -9.5 16 -5 23 32 28 19.0 71 49 61 21 34  47.0 
Sorghum  -33 -13 -14 -19 -19.6 -24 -25 -5 0 -4 -11.5 8 0 -23 -15 -20  -10.0 
Soybeans  31 52 8 10 25.1 15 -38 -37 -21 0 -16.2 -5 -2 -21 -30 -53  -22.0 
Milk  65 18 12 19 28.6 26 6 -12 39 8 13.5 n.a.  n.a. 
Chicken  94 97 82 70 85.8 86 33 33 30 22 40.6 32 14 33 n.a. n.a.  26.2 
         
Total of covered 
products 
a  -8 -6 1 -15 -7.1 -14 -18 -20  -16 -13 -16.4 -6 -11 -8 -16 -9  -9.9 
Dispersion of covered 
products
b  42 40 39 40 40.1 42 34 36 41 32 35.7 39 28 31 25 26  29.8 
 % coverage at 
undistorted prices  80 82 87 87 83.9 85 86 87 87 90 86.9 92 89 90 84 76  86.2 
a NRAs including product-specific input subsidies.  
b The simple 5-year average of the annual standard deviation around the weighted mean. 
Source: Authors’ calculations (see Appendix). 
   27




1991 1992 1993 1994 1991
-94 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 1995
-99 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004  2000
-04 
Covered products
a  -8 -6 1 -15 -7.1 -14 -18 -20 -16 -13
-
16.4 -6 -11 -8 -16 -9  -9.9 
Non-covered products  -8 -7 -1 -17 -8.2 -19 -21 -23 -20 -15
-
19.7 -6 -10 -8 -14 -7  -9.0 
All agricultural products




-6 -11 -8 -16 -9  -9.8 
Non-product-specific (NPS)  3455 6365 56457   4.1   5.5   5.5 
Total agricultural NRA 
(incl. NPS assistance)
a   -5 -2 5 -10 -3.2 -9 -15 -15  -12 -6
-
11.3 -1 -4 -3 -10 -2 -4.2 
Trade bias index
c  -24 -24 -22 -28 -24 -41 -31 -41 -47 -35 -39 -47 -36 -38 -19 -26  -33 
         
Assistance to just tradables         
   All agricultural tradables
b  -5 -2 5 -10 -3.2 -9 -15 -15 -12 -6
-
11.3 -1 -4 -3 -10 -2  -4.2 
   All non-agric tradables  9 11 12 14 11.6 11 12 15 14 15 13.3 13 14 12 14 14  13.4 
Relative rate of assistance, 
RRA
d  -13 -12 -6 -21
-
13.2 -18 -24 -26 -22 -18
-




a NRAs including product-specific input subsidies.  
b Total of assistance to primary factors and intermediate inputs divided to total value of primary agriculture production at undistorted prices (%). 
c Trade Bias Index is TBI = (1+NRAagx/100)/(1+NRAagm/100) – 1, where NRAagm and NRAagx are the average percentage NRAs for the 
import-competing and exportable parts of the agricultural sector. 
 




t are the percentage NRAs for the tradables 
parts of the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors, respectively.
  
 
Source: Authors’ calculations (see Appendix).  
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Red Beans 13.0 88.1
Meat 12.9 35.3
CTE Importables 2.0 12.6 14.6 2.1 25.5 34.2 28.2 68.3 39.9 47.3 11.6 27.2
CTE Exportables 31.7 50.6 25.0 21.8 21.9 20.9 30.7 22.3 18.8 24.6 31.3 32.9
Total CTE Agriculture 4.2 15.6 31.3 3.6 19.3 11.0 23.8 26.3 29.8 38.1 26.6 33.7 24.2 31.1
*: weighted average of CTEc and CTEcp. Weights are value of consumption of primary and processed agricultural production valued at undistorted prices.
Source: Authors' estimates following Anderson et al (2006) methodology. 
Table 9. Nicaragua: Consumer Tax Equivalent of Agriculture (Primary and Processed)*, 1991-2004
Product 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Importable
White Maize 3.6 18.7 32.0 31.1 1.7 16.5 26.9 33.1 21.7 58.0 13.9 14.3 -11.0 
-8.0 -4.4  -23.4  -2.9  23.5
-29.3  -9.4 -10.6 -16.1 -21.8 -23.9  -5.3  -5.7  -0.9 -25.2 -17.5 -20.3 
52.8 76.4 25.3 26.6 32.4 -28.7 -28.6 -11.1  12.6 9.7 -11.6 -21.9 -47.3 
-34.8 -13.5  -6.9 -32.4 -55.3 -26.6 -45.2 -52.0 -33.1 -19.2  -0.1  -34.1 -5.0 
90.7 154.3 82.9 89.0 57.1 50.6 99.8 68.9 114.1 152.3 182.5 179.1 191.3
-38.5 -40.9  -37.3 -30.0 -14.5 -43.7 -41.2 -46.4 -29.5 -38.2 -42.1 -41.9 
28.4 31.4 -3.3  7.5 -14.2 -15.1  12.6 8.0 -21.4  -3.7 -19.4 -14.5 
-6.9  -19.4  -6.2 -15.3 -10.0  15.2 -4.8 -12.4 -27.4 -12.8 -29.0  -1.0 
-11.3  12.6 11.7 26.0 45.3 41.5 28.9 19.9 12.3 10.8 14.7 4.9
-4.6  -11.8 
12.8 23.1


















Figure 1: Agricultural production and consumption shares by farm product, Nicaragua, 1991 
to 2004  
 
(percent, at undistorted prices) 
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Figure 2: Nominal rates of assistance to exportable, importable and all covered agricultural 
products, Nicaragua, 1991 to 2004  













































































   31
Figure 3: Nominal rates of assistance to all non-agricultural tradables, all agricultural tradab
industries, and relative rates of assist
a
le 

















































































t are the percentage NRAs for the tradables parts of the agricultural and non-
agricultural sectors, respectively. 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations (see Appendix). 
 
t a The RRA i
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Production and Consumption 
Crop areas are from Central Bank statistics, 1991 – 2004. 
Production, export and import volume data are from FAOSTAT (2006). 
Apparent consumption data for sorghum, soy, sugar, peanut and meat: based on technical 
information provided at the seminar titled “Fortalecimiento del Sector Privado para la 
Formulación de Políticas Agrícolas.” Instituto Interamericano de Cooperación Para la 
Agricultura (2002). 
Apparent consumption data for maize, rice, coffee, sesame and bean from FAOSTAT (2006). 
 
 
Farm-gate product prices  
Farm-gate product prices for maize, rice, sorghum, soy, sesame, peanut and meat are from 
Ministry of Agriculture, based on monthly price surveys from 1991 – 2004.  
 
Farm-gate product prices for coffee are from FAOSTAT (2006). 
 
-gate product prices for sugar and red bean are from the Central American Council for 
Wholesale product prices  
Primary products: maize, rice, sorghum, soy, sesame, peanut and meat are from Ministry of 
Agriculture monthly price surveys from 1991 – 2004; coffee prices from FAOSTAT (2006), 
and sugar and red bean are from CORECA. 
Lightly processed products are from Central Bank statistics.  
Margins are based on technical analyses in Instituto Interamericano de Cooperación Para la 
Agricultura (2002) and Ministry of Agriculture (2000). 
 
 
Border prices  
Maize, rice, soybean, and sorghum border prices are from the Development Prospects Group 
database, The World Bank. 
 
Coffee, sugar, peanut, red bean, and meat border prices are FOB prices calculated from the 
value of the country’s exports or imports divided by the volume of that trade, 
estimated with data from Central Bank statistics. 
 
Sesame border prices are reference prices from the U.S. market. 
 
Farm
Regional Agricultural Cooperation (CORECA). 
  
Farm-gate product prices for milk and chicken are from FAO producer price series (whole 
ilk, and ready-to-cook chicken).  m
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Milk whole, New Zealan ollows the OECD’s 
framework for milk Producer Support Estimates (PSE) by using a price comparison 
between the domestic and the New Zealand producer price after cost adjustments. 
Authors’ assumptions are: transportation costs to processing or final point of 
n both countries, and the calculated ratio cif/fob (equal to 
land to Ecuador is used as a proxy 








 input and trade taxes and subsidies are from Ministry of 
Anders Methodology for Measuring 
Distortions to Agricultural Incentives”, Agricultural Distortions Working Paper 02, 
World Bank, Washington DC, August. Posted at wwwr.worldbank.org/agdistortions 
 Nicaragua (BCN). Monthly Economic Indicators (Indicadores Economicos 
s). Both available at: www.bcn.gob.ni
d’s producer price, source: FAO. This study f
consumption are equal i
1.25) of actual trade of powder milk from New Zea
for international transportation costs of ‘generic’ m
Wong and Sandri 2007). 
 
Chicken border price is a reference price, (US chicken ready-to-cook, from FAO). Authors
umptions are: transportation costs to processing/final point of consumption are equal in
th countries, and US’s price is adjusted by applying the authors' calculated average ratio




Official and parallel exchange rates are from statistics of the Central Bank of Nicaragua. 
 
Input-output coefficients (conversion factors) 
All conversion factors are based on technical studies in “Fortalecimiento del Sector Privado 
para la Formulación de Políticas Agrícolas.” Instituto Interamericano de Cooperación Para la
gricultura (2002) and Ministry of Agriculture (2 A
 
Conversion factors for processed peanut include information obtained from interviews with







List of data sources 
 
 
on, K., W. Martin, D. Sandri and E. Valenzuela (2006), “
Central Bank of
Mensuales) and Macroeconomic Statistics of the last 40 Years (Estadisticas 
Macroeconomicas de 40 Año  . 
AOSTAT (2006), Food and Agriculture Organization Statistics Databases. Available at: 








Ministry of Finance (MIHCP). 
) 
Ministry of Agriculture. Informe Anual de Precios for years 1991 – 2004. Available at the 
Ministry of Agriculture library, Km. 8 ½ Carretera Masaya, Managua, Nicaragua 
(physical copies only). 
Tariffs Statistics compiled in Sistema Arancelario 
Centroamericano database. Available online for years 1999 – 2004 at: 
http://www.mific.gob.ni:81/docushare/dsweb/View/Collection-397 and earlier years 
available upon request from the Ministry of Industry, Commerce and Trade  (MIFIC
(www.mific.gob.ni) or the Customs Department of the Ministry of Finance 
(www.dga.gob.ni). Other years available physically at the MIFIC library. 
The World Bank (2006), Development Prospects Group Database.  
Valenzuela, E., S. Wong and D. Sandri (2007), “Distortions to Agricultural Incentives in 





Appendix Table 1: Prices and NRAs for primary products,Nicaragua, 1991 to 2004 
Maize Rice  Sorghum  Soybean offee  C
NRA =  NRA =  NRA =  NRA =  NRA = 





































MT  BP 
1991  1031  996  0.036 2780 3021  -0.080 664  939  -0.293 2338 1760  0.328 4872 8597  -0.433 
1992  1171  987  0.187 2853 2984  -0.044 846  934  -0.094 2691 1754  0.534 4818 6403  -0.248 
1993  1499 1136  0.320 3319 3146  0.055  950  1063  -0.106 2392 2195  0.090 5892 7279  -0.191 
1994  1703 1299  0.311 3238 4226  -0.234 1004 1197  -0.161 2657 2413  0.101 7984  13587  -0.412 
1995  1576 1550  0.017 4621 3889  0.188 1169 1494  -0.218 3156 2740  0.152 9596  24675  -0.611 
1996  2568 2204  0.165 4664 4803  -0.029 1518 1996  -0.239 2312 3728  -0.380  12748  19985  -0.362 
1997  2419 1906  0.269 6420 5128  0.252 1692 1786  -0.053 2488 4005  -0.379  13741  28837  -0.523 
3679  -0.583  1998  2563 1925  0.331 7657 5694  0.345 1866 1863  0.001 2897 3748  -0.227  14057  3
1999  2405 1977  0.217 7347 5636  0.304 1776 1883  -0.057 3487 3563  -0.021  16050  27607  -0.419 
5714  -0.298  2000  3469 2195  0.580 7040 4058  0.735 2194 2069  0.060 3706 3990  -0.071  18057  2
2001  2654 2331  0.139 7352 4857  0.514 2277 2299  -0.009 3364 3527  -0.046  14126  16254  -0.131 
2002  2891 2531  0.143 6956 4227  0.646 1859 2483  -0.252 3207 4173  -0.232  16124  17021  -0.053 
2003  2663 2992  -0.110  6180 5002  0.235 2231 2706  -0.175 3767 5549  -0.321  12013  20970  -0.427 
2004  3647 3302  0.104 8148 5954  0.369 2354 2952  -0.203 3087 6737  -0.542  20380  24661  -0.174 
 
Sugar cane  Sesame  Peanut (unprocessed)  Red Bean  Cattle 
NRA =  NRA =  NRA =  NRA =  NRA = 





































MT  BP 
1991  83  81 0.021 3422 5566  -0.385 1988 1915  0.038 3101 2743  0.130 4387 4629  -0.052 
1992 116  80 0.445 3996 6759  -0.409 1860 1792  0.038 2584 2774  -0.069 4436 4908  -0.096 
1993 138  96 0.437 5253 4636  0.133 2254 2507  -0.101 6456 3433  0.881 5179 6001  -0.137 
1994 167  108  0.549 5968 4628  0.289 2802 3367  -0.168 4687 5817  -0.194 5735 7384  -0.223 
1995 186  124  0.501 6906  11006  -0.373 2327 3098  -0.249 4083 4354  -0.062 6273 7457  -0.159 
1996  215  123  0.746  10471  14957 -0.300  3343  3891  -0.141  8820  10416 -0.153  6098  9150  -0.333 
1997  230  142  0.624  10614  12412 -0.145  3602  5260  -0.315  9892  10991 -0.100  1 7761  1266 -0.311 
1998  235  146 0.604 8770 15569  -0.437 3688  5506  -0.330 10866 9435 0.152   13 9244 447  -0.313 
1999  253  158  0.597 11179 19017  -0.412  4306  4842 -0.111 10879 11422  -0.048   138 10916 80  -0.214 
2000  265  174  0.522  11109  20724 -0.464  4742  5542  -0.144  9534  10880 -0.124    15132  11522 -0.239 
2001  290  215  0.352  13123  18625 -0.295  3723  6192  -0.399  8644  11914 -0.274  00  16109  125 -0.224 
2002 310  216  0.433  10550  17072  -0.382 4216 5687  -0.259 8324 9549  -0.128  900  17322  -0.198  13
2003  328  242  0.355  12960  22394 -0.421  4486  7192  -0.376  7562  10648 -0.290  024  18492 -0 33  16 .1
2004  346  256  0.352 18145 31252  -0.419  5223  7797 -0.330 12079 12204  -0.010 18364 20900  -0.121 
 
 
Source: Authors’ spreadsheet using methodology from Anderson et al. (2008)   36
 
 
Appendix Table 2: Prices and NRAs for lightly processed foods, Nicaragua, 1991 to 2004 
Sugar Peanut  (husked)  Meat 
NRA =  NRA =  NRA = 












price per  DP-BP
MT  MT 
BP 
MT  MT 
BP 
MT  MT 
BP 
 
19 2622 2 0. 91   1374  0.908  2969  641  124  11332  12799  -0.115 
1992 2703 1062  1.545  2844 2468 0.152  13236  11695  0.132 
19 2 93  983 1631  0.829  3451 3469  -0.005  16202  14240  0.138 
1994 3442 1821  0.890  4231 4 -0.095  17797  15724  0.132    677 
1995 3 4 -  34 7 2188  0.571  3642  288 0.151  19932  15604  0.277 
1996 7 5 -  37 2 2506  0.505  5076  392 0.059  22330  15048  0.484 
1997 14 2109  0.998  5493 73   -0.248  25011  17250  0.450   42 09
1998 7  5039 2983  0.689  5684  638  -0.256  28012  20249  0.383 
1999 6  5603 2616  1.142  6600  686  -0.013  31261  23882  0.309 
2000 5839 2314  1.524  7252  59  -0.053  33799  27800  0.216  76
2001 7009 2479  1.827  5920 8569  -0.309  35591  31331  0.136 
2002 5746 2605  1.205  6639 7847  -0.154  37726  33510  0.126 
20 7293 2612  1.792  7062  67  -0.291  39990  34494  0.159  03  99
2004 9 10 -  76 4 2640  1.915  8112  810 0.250  42189  40123  0.051 
Source ’ n et ) : Authors  spreadsheet using methodology from Anderso  al. (2008  
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Appendix Table 3: Exchange rate, Nicaragua, 1960 to 2005 
Year Official  rate parallel 
market rate 
secondary 
et rate (%) 
exchange rate using this 
study’s m ology 
b 
Secondary/  Retent n rate 
a Discount  to  Estimated equilibrium  io
mark ethod
19   n.a.  n.a. 60 7 n.a.    n.a. 
19 n.a.  n.a. 61 7  n.a.    n.a. 
1962 7  n.a.  n.a.    n.a.  n.a. 
1963 7  n.a. n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
196   n.a.  n.a.  4 7 n.a.  n.a. 
196   n.a.  n.a.  5 7 n.a.  n.a. 
196   n.a.  n.a.  6 7 n.a.  n.a. 
196   n.a.  n.a.  7 7 n.a.  n.a. 
196   n.a.  n.a.  8 7 n.a.  n.a. 
196   n.a.  n.a.  9 7 n.a.  n.a. 
197   n.a.  n.a.  0 7 n.a.  n.a. 
197   n.a.  n.a.  1 7 n.a.  n.a. 
197   n.a.  n.a.  2 7 n.a.  n.a. 
197   n.a.  n.a.  3 7 n.a.  n.a. 
197   n.a.  n.a.  4 7 n.a.  n.a. 
197   n.a.  n.a.  5 7 n.a.  n.a. 
197   n.a.  n.a.  6 7 n.a.  n.a. 
197   n.a.  n.a.  7 7 n.a.  n.a. 
1978 7  n.a. n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
1979 8.7  n.a. n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
1980 10  17.3  n.a.  73.3  7.68
1981 10  24.4  n.a.  144.3  7.69
1982 10  28  n.a.  180.0  7.70
1983 10  28  n.a.  180.0  7.70
1984 10  n.a. n.a.  n.a.  7.67
1985 26.1  666.8 1.00  2451.7  7.62
1986 66.4  1,214 1.00  1726.7  7.53
1987 70.0  6,294 1.00  8890.8  7.40
1988 190.9  673.2  1.00  252.6  7.25
1989 15,655  19,077  1.00  21.9  7.09
1990 689,958  701,710  1.00  1.7  6.94
1991 4.3  5.3  1.00 22.1  6.80
1992 5.0  5.3  1.00  6.9  6.69
1993 6.1  6.2  1.00  2.0  6.61
1994 6.7  6.9  1.00  2.8  6.55
1995 7.5  7.7  1.00  1.6  6.51
1996 8.4  8.5  0.94  0.4  6.48
1997 9.5  9.5  0.94  0.2  6.46
1998 10.6  10.6 0.95  0.4  6.45
1999 11.8  11.9 0.96  0.5  6.45
2000 12.8  12.8 0.88  0.3  6.44
2001 13.4  13.5 0.92  0.3  6.43
2002 14.3  14.3 0.96  0.1  6.42
2003 15.1  15.1 0.94  0.2  6.41
2004 15.9  16.0 0.92  0.2  n.a. 
Source: Central Bank of Nicaragua. "n.a." = not available.     
a  The proportion of foreign currency actually sold by all exporters at the parallel market rate. 
b  See Anderson et al. (2008) on the exchange rate methodology used in this study.  
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Appendix Table 4: Value shares
a of primary production of covered
b and non-covered 
























199 4  11 0 4   3 2 8 2 2 0 3  20  1  40
199 4 7 0 5   4 2  10 2 2 0 3  18 
199 4 6 1 6   5 3  12 1 2 0 3  13 
199 6 9 1 4   4 3  11 1 2 1 3  13 
199 4  17 2 5   4 3  10 3 1 1 3  15 
199 8  11 2 7   5 3 9 2 2 1 3  14 
199 6  16 2 4   4 3  10 1 1 1 3  13 
199 9  17 2 4   3 3  10 1 1 1 2  13 
199 9  18 3 4   8 4 7 0 1 0 2  10 
200 11  14 3 5   8 4 6 1 1 0 2 8 
200 11 7 3 5    10 6 6 0 1 0 2  11 
200 9 6 3 6    11 5 7 0 2 0 2  10 
200 10 8 3 6   9  3  16 












3  38 na 5 1 1 0 
4  41 na 5 1 1 0 
 
a Each row sums to 100.  
 




 farm $. 
eadsheet 
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competing  agricultural industries, and to agricultural 

























co All ag 
  abl A
c
 
1991  -8 -8  15   -5 7  -5  - 12   -12 
1992  -6 -7  14   -2 7 -9  -2  - 13  
1993  1 -1  -8    5 7 -2  5  19  
1994  -15 -17 - 24   -10 7 -16  10 - 6  
1995  -14 -19  29    -9 6 -14  -9 - 22  
1996  -18 -21 - 28   -15 5 -19  15 - 4  
1997  -20 -23 -15 -33   -15 6 -20  15  
1998  -16 -20 -12 -31   -12 6 -17  30  
1999  -13 -15  24    -6 8 -13  -6 - 17  
2000  -6 -6   -1 6 -6  -1  -19 52  
2001  -11 -10  20    -4 6 -10  -4 - 24  
2002  -8 -8   -3 5 -8  -3  -18 31  
2003  -16 -14 -10 -19  0 -10  6 -15 
2004  -9 -7 -2  -14 16 -2  6 -8 
 
 
 nontradables and non-product-specific assistance.
 
 NRAs including products specific input subsidies.  
 





t are the percentage NRAs for the 
tradables parts of the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors, respectively.  
 
Source: Authors’ spreadsheet 
 
 
a NRAs including assistance to
 
b
 